O que é este blog?

Este blog trata basicamente de ideias, se possível inteligentes, para pessoas inteligentes. Ele também se ocupa de ideias aplicadas à política, em especial à política econômica. Ele constitui uma tentativa de manter um pensamento crítico e independente sobre livros, sobre questões culturais em geral, focando numa discussão bem informada sobre temas de relações internacionais e de política externa do Brasil. Para meus livros e ensaios ver o website: www.pralmeida.org. Para a maior parte de meus textos, ver minha página na plataforma Academia.edu, link: https://itamaraty.academia.edu/PauloRobertodeAlmeida;

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Mostrando postagens com marcador China. Mostrar todas as postagens
Mostrando postagens com marcador China. Mostrar todas as postagens

segunda-feira, 15 de abril de 2024

China Continues To Dominate An Expanded BRICS - Alicia Garcia-Herrero (East Asia Forum)

 Nada de muito novo…

China Continues To Dominate An Expanded BRICS – Analysis 

By 

By Alicia Garcia-Herrero

(…)

BRIC was officially launched in 2009 and was renamed BRICS in 2010 when South Africa joined the group. Since then, trade relations have clearly grown, but in a very unbalanced manner.

Most of the growth in trade has been China-centric, with the contribution from the rest of BRICS remaining quite flat until recently. The recent increase is mostly explained by India, which has experienced an acceleration in economic growth. BRICS members are increasingly intertwined with China as far as trade is concerned, but the remaining members have very few ties among themselves. Bilateral trade between BRICS members other than China remains extremely low.

China’s sheer economic size — five times greater than India’s — and China’s increasing assertiveness in foreign policy explain China’s dominance of BRICS. BRICS countries have increasingly similar positions to China at the United Nations. This is not only the case for issues within China’s sphere, such as Xinjiang-related resolutions, but also more global issues such as resolutions on the invasion of Ukraine and the Israel–Palestine crisis.

The  only exception on Ukraine has been Brazil, which voted in line with the West in March 2022. But Brazil’s diplomatic stance on Ukraine has become much more blurred since then and its position has fully aligned with China’s on the conflict in Gaza.

China has been the leading proponent of expanding BRICS to BRICS+. The main reason for expansion was to make BRICS more representative of the developing world and give it a stronger voice on the global stage.

But the six countries invited to join — which has become five after Argentina’s withdrawal — are quite heterogenous. Some are net creditors (such as Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates), while others are net debtors and in a very weak financial position. Half of them are large exporters of fossil fuels (Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Iran). Ethiopia and Egypt stand out as members from Africa, a continent that has become increasingly important for China’s and India’s foreign policy.

The questions that arise are what BRICS can achieve with such a heterogeneous group of members, and whether it will be able to maintain its objectives after expansion.

The group has called for comprehensive reform of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank to make the institutions more representative, accountable and effective in addressing global challenges. BRICS has also consistently advocated for comprehensive reform of the United Nations, arguing that its current structure with five permanent members holding veto power does not represent the interests of all member states.

One increasingly important objective of BRICS is to become the new platform for developing countries to voice their concerns and interests. The international financial architecture is an area where members’ positions can clearly be aligned. BRICS promotes the use of local currencies in trade between its member states, especially in trade with China, as well as supporting rules-based, open and transparent global trade. The expansion of its membership evidently supports this objective.

The actual impact of BRICS expansion will depend on several factors, including the group’s ability to overcome its internal challenges and the response of the West. Still, the smooth expansion is a clear sign that the global balance of power is shifting and that developing countries are playing an increasingly important role in global affairs.

How BRICS will fare over time depends on several factors. First and foremost is how China’s power evolves. There is increasing consensus that China’s long-term growth will continue to decelerate, which will reduce the opportunities that the Chinese market has to offer for BRICS members and others. A second important factor is how BRICS members and their populations come to perceive China.

The heterogeneity of BRICS is not only economic but also political. The elephant in the room is India, which finds itself in an increasingly uncomfortable position in groupings that are dominated by China. Still, the group’s diversity and its members’ respective comparative advantages could turn out to be a boon not only for China but also for India.

BRICS, which started as a primarily economic initiative to mark the transfer of economic power to the emerging world, has grown into an important geopolitical grouping. China’s centrality and the diversity of its members present both challenges and opportunities.

The future of the grouping is uncertain, given its heavy economic dependence on China and the deteriorating sentiment towards China among its members. India’s fast growth and increasing geopolitical heft create additional challenges for the continuation of a China-centric BRICS.

  • About the author: Alicia Garcia-Herrero is Senior Research Fellow at the Brussels-based think tank Bruegel and Adjunct Professor at the Hong Kong University of Science and Technology.
  • Source: This article was published by East Asia Forum. A version of this article was first published here in EconPol Forum.


sábado, 13 de abril de 2024

Como a Tesla, de Elon Musk, plantou na China as sementes de sua própria queda - The New York Times

Como a Tesla, de Elon Musk, plantou na China as sementes de sua própria queda

 

Instalação de fábrica em Xangai foi fundamental para salvar montadora americana de crise, mas também ajudou a impulsionar a indústria chinesa de carros elétricos

 

Por The New York Times

 

 — Nova York

 

10/04/2024 

 

Quando o bilionário americano Elon Musk instalou na China uma fábrica da Tesla, a fabricante de carros elétricos controlada por ele, fez uma aposta que garantiu à empresa peças e componentes mais baratos e operários qualificados, mas, ao mesmo tempo, pode ter criado a maior ameaça ao futuro de seus negócios, ou seja, a indústria chinesa de veículos elétricos.

 

A aposta salvou a Tesla. Da crise que vivia em meados dos anos 2010, a companhia se tornou a montadora mais valiosa do mundo após as cotações de suas ações dispararem, fazendo de Musk um dos homens mais ricos do planeta, conta a edição desta terça-feira, dia 9, do podcast The Daily, do jornal The New York Times.

 

Alguns anos antes de apresentar os primeiros carros produzidos na fábrica da China, com a Tesla à beira do fracasso, Musk havia apostado no gigante asiático em busca de peças baratas e trabalhadores capazes. Nos primeiros anos de atividade, a montadora americana enfrentava atrasos no desenvolvimento dos carros e desconfiança de investidores.

 

A China, por sua vez, precisava da Tesla como uma âncora para impulsionar sua incipiente indústria de veículos elétricos. Para os líderes chineses, uma fábrica da Tesla em solo doméstico era um prêmio.Inicialmente, Musk parecia ter a vantagem na relação, garantindo concessões da China que raramente eram oferecidas a empresários estrangeiros, mas a Tesla agora está cada vez mais em apuros, perdendo sua vantagem sobre os concorrentes chineses no próprio mercado que ajudou a criar.

 

A mudança de direção da Tesla na China também amarrou Musk a Pequim de uma maneira que está sendo examinada pelas autoridades dos EUA.

 

Entrevistas com ex-funcionários da Tesla, diplomatas e técnicos de governo feitas pelo The New York Times revelam como Musk construiu uma relação simbiótica incomum com Pequim, lucrando com a generosidade do governo chinês enquanto recebia subsídios nos EUA. 

 

Enquanto Musk explorava a construção da fábrica em Xangai, os líderes chineses concordaram com uma mudança crucial na política de regulamentações nacionais de emissões de gases do efeito estufa (GEE), após uma pressão política da Tesla que não foi relatada anteriormente.

 

Essa mudança beneficiou diretamente a montadora americana, trazendo centenas de milhões de dólares em lucros estimados à medida que a produção na China decolava, descobriu o The New York Times.

 

Musk também obteve acesso incomum a líderes de alto escalão do governo chinês. Ele trabalhou em estreita colaboração o primeiro-ministro Li Qiang, quando ele era um importante oficial de Xangai. A fábrica chinesa da Tesla foi construída em velocidade recorde e sem um parceiro local, um feito inédito para uma empresa automobilística estrangeira na China.

 

O bilionário, que já insinuou que os trabalhadores americanos são preguiçosos, aproveitou a unidade chinesa para fugir de problemas com legislações trabalhistas.

 

Em Fremont, na Califórnia, a primeira fábrica da Tesla enfrentou problemas com autoridades e sindicatos por causa de questões trabalhistas. Na China, após a morte de um trabalhador da Tesla em Xangai no ano passado, um relatório citando lacunas de segurança foi retirado do ar.

 

Além disso, Musk obteve a política de emissões de GEEs. Modelada a partir de um programa da Califórnia que tem sido um benefício para a Tesla, a política concede créditos aos fabricantes de automóveis por produzir carros limpos – o Sistema de Negociação de Emissões (ETS, na sigla em inglês) da Califórnia, um dos maiores do mundo, rendeu à Tesla, de 2008 a 2023, US$ 3,7 bilhões, segundo o gabinete do governador local.

 

Para pressionar pela mudança regulatória, a Tesla se aliou a ambientalistas da Califórnia, que estavam tentando limpar os céus poluídos da China e viam na exportação do modelo de ETS a confirmação de seu sucesso. A China introduziu o seu ETS em 2017.

 

Todo esse movimento ajudou a tornar a Tesla a empresa de automóveis mais valiosa do mundo, mas o sucesso da montadora americana por lá também forçou as marcas locais a inovar.

 

A China está agora produzindo carros elétricos baratos, mas bem feitos, enquanto o líder chinês Xi Jinping visa transformar o país em uma “potência automobilística”.

 

Fabricantes de automóveis chineses como BYD e SAIC estão avançando na Europa, ameaçando fabricantes estabelecidos como Volkswagen, Renault e Stellantis – dona das marcas Fiat, Peugeot, Citröen e Jeep. As montadoras americanas, como Ford e General Motors (GM), também estão correndo para acompanhar o ritmo.

 

— Há “antes da Tesla e depois da Tesla” — disse Michael Dunne, consultor automotivo e ex-executivo da General Motors na Ásia, sobre o efeito da empresa na indústria chinesa. — A Tesla foi a faz-tudo.

 

Musk agora está andando na corda bamba. Ele soou o alarme sobre os rivais da China, mesmo permanecendo dependente do mercado e da cadeia de suprimentos chineses e repetindo os pontos de vista geopolíticos de Pequim.

 

O bilionário alertou em janeiro que, a menos que as marcas automobilísticas chinesas fossem bloqueadas por barreiras comerciais, elas “praticamente demoliriam a maioria das outras empresas automobilísticas do mundo”. O preço das ações da Tesla despencou após vendas lentas na China, fazendo Musk perder o título de homem mais rico do mundo.

 

A montadora americana está tão enraizada na China que Musk não pode se desvincular facilmente, caso queira. Os carros da Tesla custam significativamente menos para serem fabricados em Xangai do que em outros lugares, uma economia-chave quando a empresa está em uma guerra de preços com seus concorrentes.

 

No Congresso americano, os legisladores estão estudando seus laços com a China e como ele equilibra a Tesla com seus outros empreendimentos. A SpaceX, outra empresa que ele possui, tem contratos lucrativos com as forças armadas dos EUA e detém quase total controle da internet via satélite do mundo através de sua rede Starlink.

 

Musk também é dono da plataforma de mídia social X, anteriormente Twitter, que a China usou para campanhas de desinformação.

 

— Elon Musk tem uma exposição financeira profunda à China, incluindo sua fábrica em Xangai — disse o senador Mark Warner, democrata da Virgínia, que preside o Comitê de Inteligência do Senado.

 

Na China, não está claro se o governo tentou exercer pressão sobre Musk, mas as autoridades locais têm alavancas que poderiam puxar. No ano passado, várias localidades chinesas proibiram carros da Tesla em áreas sensíveis, levando a empresa a enfatizar que todos os dados chineses são mantidos localmente.

 

Em fevereiro, depois que o Departamento de Comércio dos EUA anunciou uma investigação sobre a retenção de dados pelos veículos elétricos chineses, o Global Times, um jornal do Partido Comunista da China, alertou que os consumidores chineses poderiam retaliar contra a Tesla.

 

Tesla, SpaceX e Musk não responderam a uma lista detalhada de perguntas do The New York Times. Durante um evento do jornal em novembro, Musk disse que “todas as empresas automobilísticas” dependem em parte do mercado chinês. Ele também descartou preocupações sobre SpaceX e Starlink, dizendo que não operam na China e que suas empresas não devem ser confundidas.

 

Por outro lado, em uma conversa online com dois membros do Congresso americano em julho do ano passado, ele foi mais direto. O bilionário reconheceu ter “alguns interesses pessoais” na China e se descreveu como “um pouco pró-China”.


quinta-feira, 7 de março de 2024

Os dez maiores bancos do mundo, 2023

 World's largest banks, 2023.

1. 🇨🇳 ICBC

2. 🇨🇳 China Construction Bank

3. 🇨🇳 Agricultural Bank of China

R. 🇺🇸 Bank of America

6. 🇺🇸 JPMorgan Chase

7. 🇯🇵 Mitsubishi 

8. 🇬🇧 HSBC

9. 🇫🇷 BNP

10. 🇫🇷 Crédit Agricole


(S&P Global Market Intelligence)

quarta-feira, 28 de fevereiro de 2024

Janus.Net special issue on Brazil

 Dear friends and colleagues,


Special Issue 1: Brazil, China and International Relations

Submission of article ready for review by June 2024

 

Brazil is a major economy of Latin America that acts with increasing prominence on the global economic and political stage. Brazil has over 200 million people. It is a member of international groups as diverse as G20, Mercosur and BRICS. Brazil has diversified sectors and abundant natural resources. It continues to be a global leader in the export of agricultural commodities and present promising economic growth indicators. The country has also in recent decades managed to expand its industries and service sector, attracting both domestic and foreign investments. The political landscape of Brazil is a complex one. While the country has witnessed economic growth and social progress, it has also been confronted with major challenges related to social inequality, corruption and political trust. Against this background, JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations will be publishing a special issue that discusses Brazil in a greater context. It is hoped that this initiative will bring together experts and scholars interested in the Federative Republic of Brazil and its international forays, asking what the future holds for emerging partners hailing from as far as the People’s Republic of China.

 

We call for:

  • New approaches for the study of Brazil with a focus on world engagement preparedness
    • Novel epistemologies and conceptualizations that advance our knowledge of Brazil and its preparedness for engagement;
    • Studies of Brazil that address “the modern international” using innovative and unconventional IR methods;
    • Up-to-date studies of Brazil by humanistic social sciences scholars that also pertain to “the modern international”;
    • Studies of Brazil that actively engage with the latest Global South, Feminist and Post-Humanist epistemologies;
  • Studies on Brazil with a focus on Chinese presence, engagement and interests;
  • Studies that highlight the knowledge produced in Brazil / the South Atlantic that is also applicable to our understanding of Chinese action in the world;
  • Studies that advance our understanding of Global China and its global engagement;
  • Studies that put Asian Studies, Latin American Studies, Lusophone Studies and other area studies in conversation;
  • Historicized transcontinental studies of agency and identity that promote greater awareness of world connectivity and interdependence.

Scholars may use qualitative, quantitative and mixed method approaches. They may be interested in different subjects and based in different parts of the world. While we may expect greater interest from International Relations scholars, we are open also to submissions from other members of the learned community. They are expected to place Brazil and its connections with the outside world, especially Asian partners such as China, at the center of their analysisIt is hoped that the special issues will be published in December 2024.

We are looking forward to receiving your valuable contribution!


Francisco José Bernardino da Silva Leandro

Associate Professor with Habilitation - Deputy Director of Institute of Global and Public Affairs - Faculty of Social Sciences -  Department of Government and Public Administration (DGPA) - University of Macau  - E21B Building - Office 4051

Avenida da Universidade – Taipa - Macau SAR (China)

Times Higher Education (2023) Ranking: 193th in the world and 33rd in Asia

 

利天佑

副教授(已獲特許任教資格)

全球與公共事務研究所 副主任

澳門大學 社會科學學院 政府與行政學系E21B-4051

澳門氹仔大學大馬路


domingo, 25 de fevereiro de 2024

China, de volta ao seu passado imperial sob o imperador Xi - Carl Minzner (Council on Foreign Affairs)

 Eu já chamava o Xi de imperador desde a sua recondução à liderança total pela segunda vez. No terceiro mandato é evidente que ele é mais imperador do que secretário geral do PCC. PRA

Beijing’s Ideological Pivot Back To the Past

As China turns the page from its reform era, the Chinese Communist Party's official discourse increasingly references the country's imperial past. 
Blog Post by Carl Minzner
Council on Foreign Relations, February 23, 2024 3:42 pm (EST)

https://www.cfr.org/blog/beijings-ideological-pivot-back-past

China’s official discourse is pivoting back to its imperial past. 

Since his rise to power in 2012, Xi Jinping has steadily infused his official speeches and pronouncements with an increasing number of classical Chinese idioms and historical references. Chinese state television now hosts a regular program (平“语”近人——习近平喜欢的典故) in which scholars analyze idioms and references invoked by Xi, helping to interpret classical concepts for the public and tie them to both central Party slogans and China’s current social realities. Naturally, these trends are entirely consistent with the overall direction of Party ideology, including the Party’s 2021 resolution on history, which emphasizes the need to fuse Marxism with China’s “traditional culture.”

Such uses of imperial history are not limited to current officials. After China’s former central bank governor Yi Gang stepped down from his post, his first interview in January 2023 was an extended discursive analysis of Song dynastic paper currency reforms of the late 10th century. For at least one Chinese commentator, such comments read as a careful, coded warning against government overspending and the risk of currency devaluation and inflation.

Interpreting the political rhetoric emanating from Beijing is far from a new problem—particularly as it has regularly shifted over time. During the 1950s and 60s, foreign analysts had to parse abstract Marxist formulations in the People’s Daily for signals as to which cadres had fallen into disrepute, or whether tensions with the Soviet Union were on the rise. With the birth of the reform era in the late 1970s, invocations of Western or Japanese models became de rigueur for officials seeking to promote economic or legal reform.

But the era in which it was politically acceptable to—at least publicly—frame policy proposals in China by direct comparison with desirable foreign models is drawing to a close. And a new one is dawning - one in which the increasingly preferred, and politically correct, framework will be to search China’s own past (including its own imperial and classical heritage) for the proper model or reference point. As current ideological and political trends deepen, it is quite likely that both official Chinese Party pronouncements and what careful, studied criticism of those policies can still exist in Beijing’s ever-stultifying atmosphere will be increasingly cloaked in yet deeper and deeper references to China’s own past. 

For foreign analysts and scholars of China, this will be particularly challenging. It is already hard enough figuring out what is taking place within the black box of Chinese politics, particularly as other sources of information (such as databases of academic articles and court decisions) steadily dry up. Numbers of American college students specializing in Chinese language or studies are declining; those actually studying in China now number only in the hundreds, compared with over 10,000 in the late 2010s. 

Are we really ready for an era in which our ability to appreciate complex debates over Chinese financial policies may hinge on our ability to understand how Song dynastic practices are being invoked in financial circles in Beijing? Or understand whether a given classical Chinese expression that begins to gain traction in military journals is a call for action, or restraint? 


domingo, 7 de janeiro de 2024

The Globalist: O fim do papel na civilização que o inventou - Branko Milanovic and the Paperless country, China

Global Diary
Paperless China?
January 7, 2024
Dear reader,

The abolition of paper is in full swing in the country that invented it – China.

As our contributor Branko Milanovic discovered, what is striking in today’s China is the complete disappearance of paper as a means to convey information. And while similar developments are observable elsewhere, China is ahead.

This begs the question: Is placing all of modern knowledge in the electronic format a good idea? After all, it has already revealed its weaknesses – many websites, links and blogs where information was stored are already by now broken, deleted or have been moved elsewhere.

Viewed in a global context, does this mean that when our civilization vanishes, the new researchers, perhaps thousands of years away, will eventually be faced by the conundrum: Did literacy simply disappear?

Enjoy this fascinating read.
Cheers,
Stephan Richter
Publisher and Editor-in Chief

Global Diary
January 7, 2024

By Branko Milanovic 
The abolition of paper is in full swing in the country that invented it. 

https://www.theglobalist.com/paperless-china/ 

China is considered to have been the first country (civilization) to have created the modern version of paper.

Paper is listed as one among the four big Chinese inventions (the other three are the compass, gun powder and printing). Perhaps it will be the first country to “dis-invent” paper, too.

Coming full circle?

What is striking in today’s China, compared to even as recently as five years ago, is the complete disappearance of paper. I mean paper as a means to convey information – not paper as in paper napkins in cafés.

Some of this disappearance is perhaps justifiably celebrated. Instead of metro cards that can be easily displaced, there are electronic tickets on cell phones. Instead of plastic credit cards, there are Alipay and similar systems available on your phone. Instead of crumpled banknotes, there are touchless screens to use for payments.

Slightly ahead of the rest of the world

It would be wrong to take this as an ideological feature linked to the current system of electronic surveillance in China. Very similar developments are observable elsewhere, in all modern societies. China is just slightly ahead of the rest of the world.

But, even the very ideological dimension of political propaganda is affected by this. In the past, Chinese museums linked with various CPC events had on display a variety of officially-approved publications – speeches, resolutions and biographies.

Almost nothing of that remains. In the excellent Shanghai museum dedicated to the founding congress of the Chinese Communist Party, there is just one book that can be bought in the museum store.

The store sells pens, badges, umbrellas, toys, bags and pandas – but no written documents. One would search in vain for such elementary publications as the Founding Act of the CPC, its first resolutions etc.

Moreover, looking at the rich exhibits that deal with the New Culture movement of the 1920s and numerous publications that are displayed in the museum, one wonders what could in the future be shown from similar cultural movements of today? Copies of emails? Laptops where the texts are stored?

The dematerialization of information

Such dematerialization of information can be celebrated, perhaps at times excessively given the relatively modest gains in efficiency that are achieved compared to the older system. But the paeans disregard one important feature.

People’s interactions are not solely based on the present. Our interactions and opinions are so many “bottles thrown into the sea” in the hope of explaining our current thinking and conveying to the future what we feel and what we have learned.

This is the advantage of a written system compared to the oral. The oral system could neither transmit information over time, nor do it accurately. We have Homer’s verses today because somebody eventually was able to write them down.

Things would not have come to us had they not been preserved on scripts made of papyrus. Or, even better, as the Egyptians, Greeks and Romans did, preservation of certain facts was entrusted to the stone. It was more durable than paper – but it was hard to carve and carry longer and more complex messages.

Goodbye newspapers

In the three weeks I spent in China, I saw two desultory copies of a Chinese-language newspaper in a Beijing hotel and “China Daily” displayed in a bar not touched by anyone, one person reading what appeared to be a newspaper in a Shanghai museum and a father reading a comic book to his child on a train. I saw no other piece of information recorded on paper.

Surely, I went to a big bookstore in Shanghai with six floors of books, or have seen a beautiful new library at the Zhejiang University.

There are plenty of books there. So paper as a means of conveyance or storage of information has not completely disappeared. But its function to convey today’s information into the future has apparently ceased.

This is not a trivial issue. Whether information about a subway trip is encrusted on a piece of paper or stored within your cell phone does not matter to future generations. But placing the entire modern knowledge in the electronic format is dangerous.

The danger

We can already see the first effects of it. The electronic system of storage is old enough for us to have noticed that many websites, links and blogs where information was stored are already by now broken, deleted or have been moved elsewhere.

Information on household income or people’s characteristics that was collected in the past is in many cases lost because the software systems used to read and process such information have changed.

Ironically, but not at all surprisingly, all the information that we can get regarding some past surveys of population (and I am not talking here about ancient data, but information that is twenty years old) comes from the printed summaries of such sources.

I have seen this very clearly with Soviet household surveys whose data have all been irretrievably lost because already by the early 1990s the technology had entirely changed, and short of enormous and expensive effort, the Soviet-made computer cards could no longer be read.

But the problem is the same everywhere. U.S. micro data from the 1950s and early 1960s are impossible to access any more.

Conclusion

With full transfer to electronic-only information, we are moving to an ever-ruling “presentism.” Information can be seemingly efficiently and costlessly transmitted today or over a very short time period, but is afterwards lost forever.

When our civilization vanishes, the new researchers, perhaps thousands of years away, will be faced by the conundrum: Did literacy disappear?

How to explain that a civilization from which there are millions of written records (that would be saved the way that the Dead Sea Scrolls were saved) had suddenly abandoned literacy and gone back to oral communication and barbarism?

In fact this very post, for whatever it is worth, will be forever gone as soon as the website you read it on folds and another format of dissemination takes over. Until then, try to carve it in stone…