Financial Times on Russia: a special edition April 10, 2024

 

Russia EU’s sanctions regime in turmoil after oligarchs win legal battle APRIL 11, 2024

Russia ˃ A Nasty Little War — when the west tried to overturn the Russian revolution Anna Reid’s vivid history of an ill-judged intervention in 1918 demonstrates that we underestimate Russia at our peril APRIL 11, 2024 Europe should talk less and prepare more against Russian threat, says Finnish president Alexander Stubb urges allies to refrain from ‘belligerent’ rhetoric about Russia attacking soon APRIL 11, 2024 David Cameron warns US politicians against ‘appeasement’ of Russia  UK foreign secretary steps up efforts to secure aid for Ukraine but is snubbed by senior Republican APRIL 10, 2024 EU court rules in favour of Russian oligarchs Fridman and Aven in blow to sanctions regime Judgment finds insufficient evidence that billionaires had undermined Ukraine APRIL 10, 2024 Terror attack creates a central Asian dilemma for Putin Tajiks are among those blamed for the massacre but Russia’s war economy depends on immigrant Muslim workers APRIL 10, 2024 Russia is filling the vacuum left by the west in the Sahel The courting of Niger’s military junta epitomises the growing security challenge in this part of Africa APRIL 10, 2024

Gazprom grapples with collapse in sales to Europe -Financial Times

Gazprom grapples with collapse in sales to Europe 

Business model in tatters after biggest customer slashes 

Financial Times, Feb 17, 2024

Gazprom grapples with collapse in sales to Europe.

Vladimir Putin was effusive late last year after Gazprom reported record sales to China, telling chief executive and longtime ally Alexei Miller: “This is great, I congratulate you on the results of your work.” 

But the Russian president’s praise, proudly trumpeted on state media, belies the crisis unfolding at a company that is struggling with the loss of its biggest market. Europe has defied expectations by breaking its addiction to Russian gas, and the state-run gas monopoly — Putin’s trump card when he launched his full-scale invasion of Ukraine — has become one of the war’s biggest corporate casualties. “Gazprom understands that it will never again have as big and fat a slice of the pie as Europe, and it simply has to accept that,” said Marcel Salikhov, head of the Institute for Energy and Finance, a Russian think tank. “The only way forward now is to look for relatively smaller sources of revenue and gradually develop them, gathering crumbs.” In an interview with state television channel Rossiya 1 on Sunday, Putin admitted Russia had previously profited more from exporting energy, but denied the loss of business was causing problems. “Maybe it was more fun [previously], but on the other hand, the less we depend on energy, the better, because the non-energy part of our economy is growing,” he said. While Moscow decided early in the war to slash gas supplies to Europe, a move that initially boosted prices enough to offset the slump in exports, the effect was shortlived. Pre-tax earnings hit a record Rbs4.5tn ($49.7bn) in the first six months of 2022 but slumped 40 per cent to Rbs2.7tn a year later, while net profits slid from almost Rbs1tn to Rbs255bn. 

Researchers at the state-controlled Russian Academy of Sciences have even predicted the company’s full-year 2023 results will show it has ceased to be profitable, and that net losses could hit Rbs1tn by 2025. The EU has proved more adept at sourcing alternative gas than many thought possible — Russia’s share of the bloc’s gas imports dropped from more than 40 per cent in 2021 to 8 per cent last year, according to EU data — while prices have collapsed from their peaks in the early days of the war. 

The EU is aiming to eliminate all imports of Russian fossil fuels by 2027. On Sunday, Putin said Russia had coped well after Europe stopped buying its gas, “by exploring alternative routes and focusing on its own gasification efforts.” But in reality these are not a replacement for the EU export business. With its main export business in tatters, Gazprom has sought to find new buyers but its deals in central Asia and minor supply boosts to China and Turkey will compensate for only 5 per cent to 10 per cent of the lost European market, according to Salikhov. Achieving any substantial change in this scenario will require enormous investment in pipelines and other infrastructure to serve new markets, as well as the involvement of external partners that are in less of a hurry to commit. When the invasion began, Gazprom appeared to be in a much better position than other Russian energy exporters given that the country’s gas, unlike its oil, was not under any western sanctions. But its prospects changed in September 2022 when underwater blasts ruptured the Nord Stream gas pipelines that had carried 40 per cent of Russia’s gas exports to Europe, drastically reducing Moscow’s ability to use the fuel as leverage. Moscow and the west have accused each other of sabotage. Gazprom did not reply to a request for comment. The Russian market, which has always accounted for a much bigger share of the company’s output than Europe, has helped it stay afloat but with gas sold at a much lower price domestically, local sales cannot make up for the collapse of the EU market. Gazprom has to sell gas domestically at regulated prices, while competitors such as Rosneft and privately-run Novatek can offer discounts to attract bulk buyers. “After the war started, Gazprom intensified its efforts to ensure fair competition on the Russian market with the lifting of domestic price restrictions,” said Irina Mironova, a lecturer at the European University at Saint Petersburg, who previously worked as an analyst at Gazprom. Critics have long suggested that Putin has used the group to funnel profits to his acolytes — although the subject remains taboo in Russia. State-owned Sberbank’s investment arm in 2018 sacked two senior analysts after they published a report saying Gazprom deliberately opted for unprofitable projects to secure lucrative contracts for companies owned by the president’s close friends Gennady Timchenko and Arkady Rotenberg. Gas emanating from a leak on a Nord Stream pipeline in the Baltic Sea in 2022. Moscow and the west have accused each other of sabotage 

“Gazprom’s model, which consisted of generating excessive profits in Europe and then distributing them among contractors close to Putin . . . no longer exists,” said Vladimir Milov, a former deputy energy minister who was the architect of Gazprom’s reforms in the early 2000s and who later became an associate of opposition figure Alexei Navalny, who died in an Arctic penal colony on Friday according to Russian authorities. 

The primary recipient of Gazprom’s profits is now the Russian state, which shortly after the invasion imposed an additional monthly levy of Rbs50bn on the company until 2025. While gas exports to China have risen, the volumes remain relatively small — Russia sent about 22bn cubic metres of gas to the country via pipeline last year, a fraction of the average annual 230 bcm it exported to Europe in the decade before the Ukraine war. The company could improve its prospects if it reaches an agreement on the construction of the 3,550km “Power of Siberia 2”, which would connect the gasfields that once supplied Europe to China, and a second pipeline to the Asian nation. 

However, Beijing and Moscow have yet to agree on the PS2 project, which will pass through Mongolia. “Those two sides still need more time to do more detailed research on the economic studies,” Mongolia’s Prime Minister Luvsannamsrain Oyun-Erdene told the FT in January. 

The gas group has become one of the war’s biggest corporate casualties. 

Even under the most optimistic scenario the PS2 would take years to build and would not make up for lost European sales, independent analysts and state-sponsored researchers agree. Construction of the pipeline will also be different from other Gazprom projects, as it will most likely be financed from the state budget — which has historically enjoyed generous contributions from the gas company — and not from Gazprom’s excess profits. Meanwhile, while Russian liquefied natural gas exports are gradually increasing, they remain a fraction of the prewar pipeline deliveries. Novatek accounts for most of Russia’s LNG exports, with Gazprom lacking the specialised infrastructure to convert and transport the liquid form of the fuel, having bet on pipelines rather than liquefaction technologies at the dawn of the Putin era. Gazprom’s oil business, Gazprom Neft, has become the company’s main lifeline, contributing 36 per cent of revenues and 92 per cent of net income in the first half of 2023. The division’s market value even surpassed that of its parent company last year. “Oil is not a side business for Gazprom, it is not just the cherry on the cake — it is the entire layer of it,” said Sergey Vakulenko, a former head of strategy at Gazprom 

Neft who is now a non-resident scholar at the Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center. 

Gazprom’s oil business, Gazprom Neft, has become the company’s main lifeline © Oliver Bunic/Bloomberg 

He also noted Gazprom’s generous dividends to shareholders including the state had often been very close to the sum of dividends it received from Gazprom Neft. However, he described the group’s position as “not great, not terrible”, insisting “the company isn’t yet on the verge of collapse”. 

Ron Smith, oil and gas analyst at Moscow-based BCS Global Markets, also said Gazprom’s financial position was not yet “catastrophic”. But the company faces the risk that its fortunes and prospects will never be the same again.

Sanções econômicas como arma de guerra - Palestra de Paulo Roberto de Almeida, a convite de Vladimir Aras (2022)

Sanções econômicas como arma de guerra

Palestra de Paulo Roberto de Almeida, a convite de Vladimir Aras

Os acasos das repostagens, por terceiras pessoas, que por vezes cruzam o meu "caminho", me levaram a um Instagram de quase dois anos atrás, sobre a guerra de agressão da Rússia contra a Ucrânia, a convite do meu ex-aluno de Doutorado Vladimir Aras, que mantém um foro de debates em Direito:

https://www.instagram.com/p/CcoEemiljnq/

Live com o professor e diplomata Paulo Roberto de Almeida sobre as consequências econômicas da guerra da Ucrânia. O professor PRA deu uma aula de história, geopolítica, direito internacional e diplomacia.

Eis o texto citado na minha alocução: 

4131. “Consequências econômicas da guerra da Ucrânia”, Brasília, 19 abril 2022, 18 p. Notas para desenvolvimento oral em palestra-debate promovida no canal Instagram do Instituto Direito e Inovação (prof. Vladimir Aras), no dia 21/04/22. Nova versão reformatada e acrescida do trabalho 4132, sob o título “A guerra da Ucrânia e as sanções econômicas multilaterais”, com sumário, anexo e bibliografia. Divulgado preliminarmente na plataforma Academia.edu (link: https://www.academia.edu/77013457/AguerradaUcrâniaeassançõeseconômicasmultilaterais2022) e anunciado no blog Diplomatizzando (20/04/2022; link: https://diplomatizzando.blogspot.com/2022/04/a-guerra-da-ucrania-e-as-sancoes.html). Transmissão via Instagram (21/04/2022; 16:00-17:06; link: https://www.instagram.com/tv/CcoEemiljnq/?igshid=YmMyMTA2M2Y=); (Instagram: https://www.instagram.com/p/CcoEemiljnq/).

The most dangerous European scenario - Jakub Janda

 From @JakubJanda:

“THE MOST DANGEROUS EUROPEAN SCENARIO:

Jakub Janda

Jan 27, 20333

(based on my private talks with many European political and military leaders)

If the United States would end its material military support to Ukraine in short and mid-term, it could mean the following cascade of (worst case) events:

- since Europe is unable to deliver weapons & ammo Ukraine needs in near-close quality and quantity, Ukrainian defenders will have to first select to which attackers they shoot at, later this will become a strategic problem forcing Ukrainian leadership to search for any form of cease-fire

- why would terrorist Russia agree on any cease-fire or keep such promise if they would see their own strategic initiative and Ukraine desperately lacking defensive weps and ammo? Russia would keep attacking until Ukraine has to plead for capitulation, likely leading to internal political instability in Ukraine

- during this process, we can expect several million Ukrainians running West in panic, flooding Central and part of Western Europe, leading to natural rise of far-right (which is always a Russian fifth column), shaking internal stability of European NATO member states

- since most of Europe lacks large and modern air force able to deterring Russia, we will be (as always) dependent on the decisions of the American President. Those hundreds of F-35s ordered by European nations will be coming after like 2028/2030, so we have at least 4-5 year gap when much of Europe is really vulnerable. 

- Even if brave countries like Poland, Sweden, Finland or Baltic republics spend as much as they urgently can, our strategic balance of (military and political) power to Russian terrorists is not favourable to Europeans, if we cannot be sure about American strategic decisions after January 2025

- we see a lot of symbolic actions by large European economies (Germany, France, Italy, Spain), but are they running their defense industry and spending to semi-war levels like Russia does? Not at all, because they are not scared by the most realistic change of Russian attack on EU/NATO countries in last four decades. Why? Because they are not in the first line and many within their economic establishments still hope to get back to “normal” business with Russia. We are facing the most dangerous split over strategic plans across European allies now.

So, supporting Ukrainian defenders with everything we have got is the only realistic change we have to keep this war from erupting in a geostrategic disaster for Europe.”

Ucrânia ataca pontos sensíveis da infraestrutura econômica russa - Tendar

From X, January 24, 2024

The strike against Russian oil facilities in Tuapse, Russia, only days after the successful strike against the Ust-Luga terminal removes all doubt that we are dealing with a targeted effort to eliminate all major Russian oil and gas ports, so that they are rendered useless for any operations.

When looking at the Russian oil and gas pipeline map, then you will notice that almost all of them head West. There is a small pipeline going east, but it is not connected to the main oil fields in Western Siberia and only small in size. Russia's economic lifeline goes all the way West. In the past, this was the matter of problems for the West, since Russia used this power to blackmail Europe. Now, its close proximity has become the source of weakness.

Among all of those pipelines only 5 end in Russian sea ports. Every other pipeline, especially the Druzhba pipeline, enters Western (NATO) territory and are therefore subject of sanctions or worse. The Druzhba pipeline goes anyway partly through Ukrainian territory and the rest such as the pumping stations are anyway in firing range.

3 of the pipelines end near Sankt Petersburg in the Baltic Sea, 2 of them go the Black Sea. Among of them, Ukraine successfully struck 2 already. Ust-Luga is inoperable for the next weeks or even months. Shipping companies will increasingly reconsider sending their vessels to those ports which are military targets.

This will be a big headache for the Russian war effort. The current attacks are still small in size, using a handful of drones, but already caused considerable damage. When Ukraine starts mass-hitting those ports, then the Russian air defense will not be able to stop the outcome, even when destroying 99% of all drones. 

The National Geographic map is from 2006 and yet not much has changed since then. The major difference I see is the extension of the natural gas pipeline grid of which some have been turned into "sea water pipelines". The irony behind that speak for itself. Putin and his oligarchs never ever anticipated this situation, like everything since February 2022. Everything what Moscow does makes a bad situation worse and I'm sure that sooner or later somebody in Putin's circle (of which nobody is a saint but simply tired of this vicious cycle) will do the math that it is easier to remove Putin than remove the Ukraine will for freedom and independence.

#Ukraine #Russia #Oil #NaturalGas

The global consequences of the war in Ukraine - Joschka Fischer (Social Europe)

 

The global consequences of the war in Ukraine

JOSCHKA FISCHER

That Russia lacks the means to achieve its neo-imperial vision will not stop it from pursuing it to the bitter end.

Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine on February 24th 2022 changed everything for Ukraine, for Europe and for global politics. The world entered a new era of great-power rivalry in which war could no longer be excluded. Apart from the immediate victims, Russia’s aggression most concerned Europe. A great power seeking to extinguish an independent smaller country by force challenges the core principles upon which the European order of states has organised itself for decades.

The war of Vladimir Putin, the Russian president, stands in stark contrast to the self-dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union, which occurred in a largely non-violent manner. Since the Mikhail Gorbachev ‘miracle’—when the Soviet Union started pursuing liberalising reforms under him in the 1980s—Europeans had begun to imagine that Immanuel Kant’s vision of perpetual peace on the continent might be possible. It was not.

Historical revision

The problem was that many Russian elites’ interpretation of the globally significant events of the late 1980s could not be more opposed to Kant’s idea. They saw the demise of the great Russian empire (which the Soviets had recreated) as a devastating defeat. Though they had no choice but to accept the humiliation, they told themselves they would do so only temporarily until the balance of power had changed. Then the great historical revision could begin.

Thus, the 2022 attack on Ukraine should be viewed as merely the most ambitious of the revisionist wars Russia has waged since Putin came to power. We can expect many more, especially if Donald Trump returns to the White House and effectively withdraws the United States from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

But Putin’s latest war not only changed the rules of coexistence on the European continent; it also changed the global order. By triggering a sweeping remilitarisation of foreign policy, the war has seemingly returned us to a time, deep in the 20th century, when wars of conquest were a staple of the great-power toolkit. Now, as then, might makes right.

Cold war

Even during the decades-long cold war, there was no risk of a ‘new Sarajevo’—the political fuse that detonated the first world war—because the standoff between two nuclear superpowers subordinated all other interests, ideologies and political conflicts. What mattered were the superpowers’ own claims to power and stability within the territories they controlled. The risk of another world war had been replaced by the risk of mutually assured destruction, which functioned as an automatic stabiliser within the bipolar system of the cold war.

Behind Putin’s war on Ukraine is the neo-imperial goal that many Russian elites share: to make Russia great again by reversing the results of the collapse of the Soviet Union. On December 8th 1991, the presidents of Russia, Belarus and Ukraine met in Białowieża National Park and agreed to dissolve the Soviet Union, reducing a ‘superpower’ to a regional (albeit still nuclear-armed) power in the form of the Russian Federation.

No, Putin does not want to revive the communist Soviet Union. Today’s Russian elite knows that the Soviet system could not be sustained. Putin has embraced autocracy, oligarchy and empire to restore Russia’s status as a global power, but he also knows that Russia lacks the economic and technological prerequisites to achieve this on its own.

For its part, Ukraine wants to join the west—meaning the European Union and the transatlantic security community of NATO. Should it succeed, it would probably be lost to Russia for good, and its own embrace of western values would pose a grave danger to Putin’s regime. Ukraine’s modernisation would lead Russians to ask why their political system had consistently failed to achieve similar results. From a ‘Great Russia’ perspective, it would compound the disaster of 1991. That is why the stakes in Ukraine are so high, and why it is so hard to imagine the conflict ending through compromise.

Junior partner

Even in the case of an armistice along the frozen front line, neither Russia nor Ukraine will distance themselves politically from their true war aims. The Kremlin will not give up on the complete conquest and subjugation (if not annexation) of Ukraine, and Ukraine will not abandon its goal of liberating all its territory (including Crimea) and joining the EU and NATO. An armistice thus would be a volatile interim solution involving the defence of a highly dangerous ‘line of control’ on which Ukraine’s freedom and Europe’s security depended.

Since Russia no longer has the economic, military and technological capabilities to compete for the top spot on the world stage, its only option is to become a permanent junior partner to China, implying quasi-voluntary submission under a kind of second Mongol vassalage. Let us not forget: Russia survived two attacks from the west in the 19th and 20th centuries—by Napoleon I and Adolf Hitler, respectively. The only invaders who have conquered it were the Mongols in the winter of 1237-38. Throughout Russia’s history, its vulnerability in the east has had far-reaching consequences.

The main geopolitical divide of the 21st century will centre on the Sino-American rivalry. Though Russia will hold a junior position, it nonetheless will play an important role as a supplier of raw materials and—owing to its dreams of empire—as a permanent security risk. Whether this will be enough to satisfy Russian elites’ self-image is an open question.

Joschka Fischer

Joschka Fischer was Germany’s foreign minister and vice-chancellor from 1998 to 2005 and a leader in the German Green Party for almost 20 years.

Copyright Project Syndicate 2024, ‘The global consequences of the war in Ukraine’

Russia prepares to launch new offensive but will not have operational breakthroughs: ISW - Olha Hlushchenko (Ukrainska Pravda)

Russia prepares to launch new offensive but will not have operational breakthroughs – ISW

OLHA HLUSHCHENKO —

Ukrainska pravda, MONDAY, 15 JANUARY 2024

According to data analysed by experts from the Institute for the Study of War (ISW), the Russians are preparing for a new offensive but, according to a preliminary assessment, will not be able to make operationally significant breakthroughs.

Source: Institute for the Study of War (ISW)

Details: Russian sources claim that Russian troops are preparing to launch a new offensive in the coming weeks as soon as the ground freezes in eastern and southern Ukraine.

Sergei Pereslegin, a Russian literary critic and alternative history theorist, said that the Russians will launch a large-scale offensive in Ukraine sometime between 12 January and 2 February after the ground freezes and probably after Ukrainian troops become "exhausted" from defending their positions in Avdiivka and on the eastern (left) bank of Kherson Oblast.

He also expressed concern that Russia does not have enough manpower to carry out the large-scale offensive he has predicted.

A Russian military blogger said on 14 January that the number of Russian troops at the front allows the Russians to conduct local tactical manoeuvres but that there are unlikely to be any operationally significant "breakthroughs".

He claimed that the freezing weather was affecting Russian and Ukrainian ground activity, artillery and unmanned systems along the entire frontline, especially on the Kherson front.

Another Russian blogger said that the frost was preventing Russian troops from conducting ground operations and advancing north of Verbove in western Zaporizhzhia Oblast.

Ukraine's Southern Operational Command reported that Russian aircraft could not operate in southern Ukraine due to weather conditions.

Dmitry Rogozin, the former head of the Russian space agency Roscosmos, said that the front line in western Zaporizhzhia Oblast is "buzzing like a beehive" due to the large number of Ukrainian drones.

He claimed that Ukrainian forces are allocating drones to strike every important target in western Zaporizhzhia Oblast and that the intensive use of Ukrainian drones makes it difficult for Russian personnel to rotate.

According to a previous assessment by ISW, sub-zero temperatures in Ukraine are likely to deter operations on the front line for now, but the terrain is likely to become more favourable for mechanised manoeuvre warfare as the ground freezes.

At the same time, analysts continue to assess that Russian forces are likely to try to maintain or intensify localised offensives in eastern Ukraine in an attempt to seize and retain the initiative despite the winter weather and terrain conditions.

ISW also estimates that the Russian forces will not be able to make operationally significant breakthroughs.

To quote the ISW’s Key Takeaways on 14 January: 

• Russian sources claimed that Russian forces are preparing to launch a new offensive in the coming weeks once the ground freezes in eastern and southern Ukraine. 
• Russian forces likely continue to experiment and adapt their missile and drone strike packages against Ukraine in an effort to penetrate Ukrainian air defences. 
• Representatives from 83 countries met to discuss the implementation of Ukraine’s Peace Formula on the sidelines of the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland on 14 January.
• The Kremlin continues to undertake measures to undermine the Republic of Tatarstan’s autonomy within the Russian Federation and cultural heritage despite the republic’s sacrifices on behalf of the Russian war in Ukraine. 
• The Russian Investigative Committee will officially open a case into the fire that destroyed a large Wildberries warehouse in St. Petersburg.
• Positional engagements continued along the Kupyansk-Kreminna line, near Bakhmut and Avdiivka, in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area, in western Zaporizhia Oblast, and on the east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast.
• Moscow-based international exhibition-forum "Russia" opened the Russian Ministry of Defence’s (MoD) "Army of Children" exhibit on 14 January to educate children about the military and careers in the Russian Armed Forces.
• Swedish Defence Materiel Administration announced on 14 January that it had signed an agreement with Nordic Ammunition Company (Nammo) to increase the production and deliveries of 155mm artillery ammunition to support Ukraine’s needs.
• The Kremlin is funding select non-profit organisations operating in occupied areas that propagate Kremlin social narratives.
• 
  

Um texano médio escreve para um russo comum - David D.

 Preservo todos os erros de digitação e de redação (PRA)

“ dear russian citizen...

im here in texas tonight and its about to hit 17 deg F.  yes thats about -8 to you....

many places in russia tonight are getting down to -40 with some down to -57.  tomorrow im sure with the power blackouts, and the burst heating pipes many in russia will not make it through the night..

sucks to be you....

im sorry but i dont care... and neither does the rest of the world. NO one is really thinking about russia tonight (except for me looking at the karma on the weather map).  we in the US dont give a darn about russia, its not in our head most of the time... NO ONE thinks about you at all. we have more improtant things to think of.. like who is on love island tonight, or dancing with the stars..... we dont care about russia, or its people. 

but for tonight i have 2 generators, 40 gal of gas, solar, battery back up, and a hmmwv mounted generator...  and a reliable grid. 

i also have eggs and 40 chickens, i know right.... crazy.

i will be in comfort and sleep well tonight... 

the thing is that im not rich, just a standard american that has worked hard... thats it. 

none of my army friends are dying tonight in a cold hole in another country, im not getting shelled, and again i have eggs and chickens... 

YOU could and should have everything i have, your country is rich in oil and lots of other things... BUT, YOUR dumb ass voted in a crazy murder as the leader of your country.. YOU did that, then YOU supported the invasions of georga and ukraine.... YOU DID.

it was all fun and games when you were winning, but now everything is falling apart. you cant get parts for your car, your aircraft are not flying like they should, your pipes and bursting, wildburries are burning to the ground... everything is turning to crap around you... over what?  some land in another country that the entire world has said you will never be able to keep... the entire world is against you.  yea i know you still have syria and north korea... but other than that... no one.

you have had over 1 million dead and wounded over this stupidity... you see the wounded every day on the street, people that will never be normal with missing arms and legs... and others that have nightmares in their heads that at some point will make them monsters and kill (at home) sometime in the future.. ticking bombs waiting to go off. if the war stopped today the killing would not... 

whats sad is that if you had not invaded ukraine, and was not a monster of a country the whole world would be helping you today with the cold. sending planeloads of generators and parts to make sure no one froze to death, and everything that would be needed to make your lives better. but no you had to be a jerk. 

it seems you have 3 choices now, die in ukraine, die in a unheated apartment, or someone has to show putin the window or give him "special" tea.... its sad but no one cares if nearly every russian dies tonight... just saying. 

in the words if the great clarkson....

"ow well, moving on"

and i do hope that a russian sees this note...”

Timothy Snyder on Ukraine, and the duty for Americans and Europeans: Would you sell them out?

Would you sell them out?

A question for American lawmakers about Ukraine

Timothy Snyder

November 8, 2023

 

Imagine that freedom was in decline around the world.  Imagine that things had gotten so bad that a dictatorship actually invaded a democracy with the express goal of destroying its freedoms and its people.  And yet... imagine that this people fought back.  Imagine that their leaders stayed in the country.  Imagine that this people got themselves together, supported and joined their armed forces, held back an invasion of what seemed like overwhelming force.  Imagine that their resistance is a bright moment in the history of democracy this whole century.  We don't have to imagine: that attack came from Russia and those people are the Ukrainians.  Would you sell them out?

Americans have an alliance in North America and Europe which has existed for more than seventy years, with the goal of preventing an attack from the Soviet Union and then from Russia.  Imagine that, when the Russian attack came, the hammer fell on a country excluded from that alliance.  Ukraine indeed took the entire brunt of the invasion, resisted, and turned the tide: a task assigned to countries whose economies, taken together, are two hundred fifty times larger than Ukraine's.  In so doing, Ukraine destroyed so much Russian equipment that a Russian attack on NATO became highly improbable.  With the blood of tens of thousands of its soldiers, Ukrainians defended every member of that alliance, making it far less likely that Americans would have to go to war in Europe.  Would you sell them out?   

(If there is anyone out there who still thinks that NATO had anything to do with Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, consider this: invading Ukraine made Russia far more vulnerable. If Russia actually feared NATO, invading Ukraine would be the last thing it would do. Russian leaders are perfectly aware that NATO will not invade Russia, which is why they can pull troops away from the borders of NATO members Norway and Finland and send them to kill Ukrainians.) 

For this whole century, American politicians and strategists of all political orientations have agreed that the greatest threat for a global war comes from China.  The scenario for this dreadful conflict, in which hundreds of thousands of American soldiers could fight and die, is a Chinese offensive against Taiwan.  And now imagine that this can defused at no cost and with no risk.  The offensive operation the Chinese leadership is watching right now is that of Russia against Ukraine.  Ukrainian resistance has demonstrated how difficult a Chinese offensive operation in the Pacific would be.  The best China policy is a good Ukraine policy.  Will we toss away the tremendous and unanticipated geopolitical gain that has been handed to us by Ukraine?  There is nothing that we could have done on our own to so effectively deter China as what the Ukrainians are doing, and what the Ukrainians are doing is in no way hostile towards China.  Ukrainians are keeping us safe in this as in other ways.  Would you sell them out?

Imagine, because it's true, that the whole world is watching the war in Ukraine.  From everyone else's point of view, whether they like us, hate us, or don't care about us, Ukraine seems like an obvious ally and an easy win for the United States.  Anyone around the world, regardless of their own ideology, knows that Ukraine is a democracy and America is supposed to support democracies.  Anyone around the world, regardless of the state of their own economy, knows that our economy is enormous, far larger than Russia's, and that economic strength wins wars.  Anyone around the world can easily see that Americans are not at risk in Ukraine, and that Americans draw extraordinary moral and geopolitical gains from Ukrainian resistance.  From the point of view of all observers, in other words, defunding Ukraine would demonstrate enormous American weakness.  Is that the face we want to show the world?  Do we want to tell everyone that we are unreliable and unaware of our own interests?  Ukrainians, with American help, make Americans look sensible and strong.  Would you sell them out?

Imagine that this is a winnable war, because it is. Russia's main strategic objective, the seizure of Kyiv, was not achieved.  Ukraine won the Battle of Kyiv.  Russia was forced to retreat from Kyiv and Chernihiv and Sumy oblasts.  Imagine the Russia's campaign to take Kharkiv failed.  Ukraine won the Battle of Kharkiv.  Imagine that Kherson, the one regional capital Russia has taken in this war, was taken back by Ukraine.  Ukraine won the Battle of Kherson.  Snake Island, lost early in the war, has been taken back by Ukraine.  Ukraine has taken back more than half of the territory seized by Russia in this invasion.  Knowing that all is this is true, imagine that Putin knows it too.  Russia's main offensive instrument, the paramilitary Wagner Group, staged a coup against Putin and that Putin had to kill its leader.  Imagine that Putin knows he cannot really take much more Ukrainian land -- not without American help, anyway.  Ukraine has a theory of victory that involves gains on the battlefield. Putin has a theory of victory that involves votes in the US Congress. Putin thinks that he has a better chance in the Capitol than he has in Kyiv.  Should we prove him right?

Imagine a world food system with Ukraine as a major node.  In normal times Ukraine can feed four hundred million people, and usually the UN World Food Program depends upon Ukraine.  Ukrainian exports feed some of the most sensitive parts of the Middle East and Africa.  Much of the instability in those regions is related to shortages of food.  Russia has destroyed a major dam to destroy Ukrainian farmland.  And mined Ukrainian farms on a huge scale.  Russia targets ports and grain storage facilities with its missiles, and claims the piratical right to stop all shipping on the Black Sea with its navy.  And yet...  Imagine that Ukrainians resist here as well.  Ukrainians farmers are hard at work.  Ukraine still supplies food to the World Food Program.  Ukrainians, through their own innovative weapons and clever tactics, managed to intimidate the Black Sea Fleet and open a lane for commercial shipping.  That they are feeding the people who needed to be fed.  Would you sell them out?

Imagine that we were a country that cared about war crimes.  And imagine that there was a law, an international genocide convention, that defined five actions that constitute genocide, and that Russians have committed every one of these crimes in Ukraine.  I cannot keep on writing about "imagining" when I have seen some of the death pits myself.  I cannot say "imagine" when writers I know have been murdered because they represent Ukrainian culture.  I cannot stay with my device when I read that the Russian state boasts of having taken 700,000 Ukrainian children to be russified, when every day Russian propagandists make clear that Russian war aims are exterminationist.  And yet Ukrainians resist and persist.  This is a genocide that can be stopped, that is being stopped.  We are living within the scenario, the one we say that we have been waiting for, when American actions can stop a genocide, simply by helping the people who have been targeted, simply by paying their taxes.  Whenever the Ukrainians take back land, they rescue people.  This is how they think of their liberated territories: as places where no more children will be kidnaped, no more civilians will tortured, no more local leaders will be murdered.  Would you sell out a people to a genocidal occupation?  A people that has done nothing but good for you?

I have heard the excuse that Americans are "fatigued."  I have been in Ukraine three times since the war began.  I have been in the capital and in the provinces.  I have seen almost no Americans, fatigued or otherwise, in the country.  And that is for the simple reason that we are not in Ukraine.  How can we be fatigued by a war we are not fighting?  When we are not even present?  This makes no sense.  It causes no fatigue to give money to the right cause, which is all that we are doing.  It feels good to help other people help themselves in a good cause.  

If we stop supporting Ukraine, then everything gets worse, all of a sudden, and no one will be talking about “fatigue” because we will all be talking about disaster: across all of these dimensions: food supply, war crimes, international instability, expanding war, collapsing democracies. Everything that the Ukrainians are doing for us can be reversed if we give up. Why would lawmakers even contemplate doing so?

If you happened to know lots of Ukrainians, as I do, you would know people who have been wounded or who have been killed.  You would know people who get through their days with dark circles around their eyes, because everyone has dark circles around their eyes.  You would know people who have lost someone, because everyone has lost someone.  You would know people who are grieving and yet who are nevertheless doing what they can do.  You would not know anyone in Ukraine who believes that fatigue is a reason to give up.  Would you sell such people out?

I have heard the other excuse: that we need to audit the weapons we send to Ukraine.  The expenses are minimal and the gains are great: a nickel on our defense dollar, achieving what we cannot ourselves do with all the rest.  And here's the thing: the weapons we send to Ukraine are the only ones in our stockpiles that are being audited.  They are being audited not by accountants in suits and ties but by men and women in camouflage.  They are being used and used well by people whose lives are at stake and whose country's future is at stake.  Ukrainians have used American air defense more effectively than anyone knew that it could be used.  

Ukrainians are using American missiles that we consider outdated to destroy the most advanced Russian assets.  Ukrainians are taking American weapons built in the last century and using them to defend themselves and the rest of us in this one.  In large measure they are literally using arms that we would otherwise be paying to disassemble because we regard them as obsolete.  

If that battlefield audit done by the Ukrainian army is not good enough: well, then, by all means, American lawmakers, come and visit Ukraine and see for yourself.  You and your staffers would be very welcome.  Ukrainians want you to come. It would be a very good thing if more of us visited Ukraine.

I will tell you what I witnessed in Ukraine: when Ukrainians see American weapons systems, they applaud.  Would you sell them out?

Ukraine’s hopes for maximal victory look remote - Ishaan Tharoor with Sammy Westfall (WP)

 

The Washington Post, August 20, 2023

By Ishaan Tharoor with Sammy Westfall   Email   Ukraine’s hopes for maximal victory look remote Ukrainian forces fire toward Russian positions in the Kharkiv region last month. (Heidi Levine for The Washington Post) Everyone expected Ukraine’s counteroffensive against Russian positions to be tough. But perhaps not as tough as it has been. After more than two months of attritional warfare across a vast front line stretching from the country’s east to the south, Kyiv’s forces have yet to forge any major breakthroughs. While exacting a grievous toll on the invading Russians, they have sustained significant casualties and found themselves bogged down by a thicket of Russian minefields, trenches and other fortifications. Their gains have been only incremental, no matter the billions of dollars in Western aid invested in preparing Ukraine’s push to reclaim lost territory. The difficulties, my colleagues reported at the end of last week, have led the U.S. intelligence community to conclude that the Ukrainian counteroffensive will fall short of at least one of its key goals — reaching the key southeastern city of Melitopol. It is “a finding that, should it prove correct, would mean Kyiv won’t fulfill its principal objective of severing Russia’s land bridge to Crimea in this year’s push,” my colleagues John Hudson and Alex Horton wrote. Melitopol, which straddles two key highways and a railroad line, is seen as the gateway to Crimea. Recapturing it would cripple Russia’s ability to reinforce the peninsula and would deliver a demoralizing blow, creating myriad strategic headaches for the Kremlin and opening the door for Ukraine to press further toward Crimea, which Moscow illegally annexed in 2014. Ukrainian officials, including President Volodymyr Zelensky, have insisted that their troops will reclaim every inch of Ukrainian land lost to Russia, including Crimea. In public, Western politicians and diplomats have embraced the vision, reiterating that their governments would back Ukraine in its defense for as long as it takes. In private, conversations are darker and more skeptical, with many officials gloomy about Ukraine’s prospects to expel the Russian invaders. The new U.S. intelligence assessment reflects a less-spoken, but emerging consensus. On Friday, White House national security adviser Jake Sullivan attempted to play down its significance. “Over the course of the past two years, there have been a lot of analyses of how this war would unfold coming from a lot of quarters,” he told reporters at Camp David ahead of a U.S.-convened summit with South Korea and Japan. “And we’ve seen numerous changes in those analyses over time as dynamic battlefield conditions change.” But U.S. officials and their European counterparts are increasingly more circumspect about what they hope Ukraine’s counteroffensive can achieve. “I had said a couple of months ago that this offensive was going to be long, it’s going to be bloody, it’s going to be slow,” Gen. Mark A. Milley, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, told The Post last week. “And that’s exactly what it is: long, bloody and slow, and it’s a very, very difficult fight.” “To commit our reserve forces we need to be sure that the pathways are clear,” Yuriy Sak, an adviser to the Ukrainian minister of defense, told my colleague Susannah George. “We would rather go slower and make sure that we preserve the lives of our troops.” An analysis from the Institute for the Study of War published after my colleagues’ report said that “it is premature to make assessments about the overall success of ongoing Ukrainian counteroffensive operations occurring along several lines of advance toward several different apparent objectives.” Away from the front lines, the war is intensifying as well. While Ukraine has stepped up drone attacks into Russian territory, Russia continues its indiscriminate campaign of missile strikes on Ukrainian civilian areas. On Saturday, a Russian attack on a public square in the northern city of Chernihiv killed at least seven people, including a child. Zelensky, who was on a trip to Northern Europe in search of further military assistance, vowed to “respond tangibly.” The reality of this difficult fight has led to some unusually blunt admissions. A top NATO official, Stian Jenssen, triggered a Ukrainian outcry after he was quoted at a public event in Norway suggesting that he could see a scenario where Ukraine received membership in the Western military alliance if it accepted some territorial concessions to Russia. NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg, for whom Jenssen is chief of staff, had to walk back his subordinate’s remarks. “It is the Ukrainians, and only the Ukrainians, who can decide when there are conditions in place for negotiations, and who can decide at the negotiating table what is an acceptable solution,” he said, echoing rhetoric that Western officials have routinely put forward when confronted with questions about the endgame in Ukraine. But Ukrainian concessions appear to be something many in Western countries are willing to countenance. The U.S. role in supporting Ukraine will probably become more polarizing at home as the war drags on and the 2024 elections draw nearer. Some polls now show a majority of American voters, especially Republicans, are skeptical of additional aid to Kyiv. That’s being picked up by some of those vying to be the Republican presidential nominee. “Our goal should not be for [Russian President Vladimir] Putin to lose. Our goal should be for America to win,” Vivek Ramaswamy, a surprise dark horse in the race, told CNN on Thursday, suggesting American investment in Ukraine’s fight for survival was pushing Russia and China closer together. “I would freeze the current lines of control, and that would leave parts of the Donbas region with Russia,” Ramaswamy said. “I would also further make a commitment that NATO will not admit Ukraine to NATO.” Such a proposal explains why the Biden administration thinks Putin is invested in fighting this war through to the 2024 election. “Putin knows that the leading Republican candidate for president next year, former president Donald Trump, would end U.S. support for Ukraine, and that there are others like him in Europe,” wrote Tom Malinowski, a former Democratic congressman and U.S. diplomat. “A forever war favors Putin, not Ukraine.” In his op-ed, Malinowski suggested the best pragmatic solution for the Ukrainian endgame would combine supporting Kyiv’s counteroffensive as far as it goes until some point next year before the major NATO summit in Washington. There, the Western military alliance would commit to extending membership and treaty protections to Ukraine over the territory it controls. That would mark an implicit concession of territory to Russia, but make real a strategic nightmare for Putin of converting a nation whose sovereignty he has long dismissed into another strong NATO member on his borders. Talk of endgames in the war, though, remains fanciful. So far, no Russian commitment to good-faith negotiations materialized. “No one is seriously considering or discussing a diplomatic end to the war: a notion that looks to many high-profile Russians like a personal threat, given all the war crimes that their country has committed and the responsibility that the entire elite now bears for the carnage in Ukraine,” wrote Tatiana Stanovaya in Foreign Affairs, referring to the consensus view among the Kremlin elite. “Peace for Ukraine must at some point involve negotiations with Russia,” wrote Brookings scholar Constanze Stelzenmüller in a recent essay. “But given the Kremlin’s implacable attitude, the burden of proof for the credibility of its negotiating offers would be extremely high. An armistice based on a freezing of the status quo in the form of continued Russian occupation of Crimea and the Donbas would reward Putin’s aggression and merely pause hostilities.” To avoid “the risk that an end to the war becomes an interregnum between wars,” she concluded, “only the strongest guarantees — a clear, constructive, and hopefully short path to NATO and EU membership — can satisfy Ukraine’s security interests, and indeed those of the Western alliance.” A total diplomatic victory for Kyiv could help make up for the absence of a total military one.